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IN A TREATISE OF HUMAN Nature, David 
Hume memorably claims that «reason is, 
and ought only to be the slave of the pas-
sions, and can never pretend to any other of-
fice than to serve and obey them».1 In 
Humean Nature,2 I argue that we should ac-
cept the Humean view that desire drives all 
our motivation and practical reasoning be-
cause it provides the best explanation of how 
human beings act, think, and feel. This 
would be trouble for many metaethical theo-
ries, as they would then entail that human 
beings can’t make moral judgments. I pro-
pose a new theory of moral judgment that 
avoids this problem by understanding moral 
concepts in terms of feelings like guilt, admi-
ration, and hope.  
The Humean Theory consists of the fol-
lowing two claims, which give desires com-
bined with means-end beliefs an important 
motivational role. In the following, “A”, “E”, 
and “M” suggest “action”, “end”, and 
“means”: 
 
Desire-Belief Theory of Action: One is mo-
tivated to A if and only if desire that E is 
combined with belief that one can raise 
E’s probability by A-ing.  
 
Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning: Desire 
that M is created as the conclusion of rea-
soning if and only if the reasoning com-
bines desire that E with belief that M 
would raise E’s probability. It is eliminat-
ed as the conclusion of reasoning if and 
only if the reasoning eliminates such a 
combination.  
 
Many philosophers, including Michael 
Smith,3 formulate the Humean Theory so 
that it doesn’t include anything like the De-
sire-Belief Theory of Reasoning. But the most 
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metaethically interesting version of the 
Humean Theory includes both principles, as 
I’ll demonstrate. The metaethical signifi-
cance of the Humean Theory comes mainly 
from the following puzzle, which Smith dis-
cusses at length. It consists of three claims, 
one of which must be rejected to avoid a dis-
astrous result. 
 
1.  [Cognitivism] Moral judgments are be-
liefs. 
2.  [Internalism] Moral judgments can pro-
duce their own motivational force. 
3.  [Humean Theory] 
------------------------------------------------- 
[Disastrous result] There are no moral 
judgments. 
 
Thomas Scanlon4 and many other players 
in recent metaethical debates combine cogni-
tivism and internalism, treating moral judg-
ments as beliefs that can produce their own 
motivational force. But the Humean Theory, 
as formulated above, leaves no way for beliefs 
to produce their own motivational force. They 
can’t do it directly, and they can’t do it by cre-
ating desires through reasoning. So if all three 
of these theories are true, we arrive at the dis-
astrous result. No real mental state can do the 
things that are essential to moral judgment.  
Leaving out the Desire-Belief Theory of 
Reasoning is essential to Smith’s solution. In-
ternalists like Smith are satisfied if moral 
judgments produce motivational force by 
creating new desires through reasoning that 
doesn’t depend on pre-existing desires. (In-
ternalism is false if the only way moral judg-
ments motivate action is by combining with a 
pre-existing desire to act morally. Then the 
motivational force really comes from the de-
sire, not from the moral judgment.) Smith 
permits beliefs to generate desires in a way that 
satisfies internalism and violates the Desire-
Belief Theory of Reasoning. On his view, believ-
ing that an action is right can generate a new 
desire to act, through reasoning: «the new de-
sire is acquired precisely because it is believed 
to be required for us to be rational».5 As Smith 
shows, his weakened version of the Humean 
theory permits us to make moral judgments 
that satisfy cognitivism and internalism. 
But this is exactly why a metaethically 
significant version of the Humean Theory 
must include the Desire-Belief Theory of Rea-
soning. If you accept cognitivism and inter-
nalism, you don’t have to care about whether 
Smith’s weak formulation of the Humean 
Theory is true. Moral judgment as you de-
scribe it will be possible either way. But you 
have to deny the strong version of the 
Humean Theory that I defend, since it en-
tails that no mental state can do what you 
think moral judgment would have to do. 
Since the strong version of the Humean Theo-
ry has the philosophically interesting conse-
quences that Smith’s weak formulation lacks, 
the strong version is the one that it’s im-
portant to debate. (As a historical point, 
Hume’s famous line about reason being the 
“slave of the passions” fits poorly with Smith’s 
view, which allows beliefs about reasons to 
create and eliminate desires. That would make 
the passions the slaves of reason. While the 
metaethical literature treats Smith as the most 
significant contemporary defender of the 
Humean Theory, he should instead be regard-
ed as betraying Hume to the Kantians.)  
While some philosophers think of the 
Humean Theory as a conceptual claim about 
how action-explanations must be structured, 
I defend it as an empirical claim about hu-
man psychology. This leaves the puzzle just 
as gripping. If moral judgments are beliefs 
with their own motivational force, and hu-
mans are incapable of having such mental 
states, humans are incapable of making mor-
al judgments. I call this disastrous result 
“human incapabilism about moral judg-
ment”, or “incapabilism” for short. 
All philosophers who reject incapabilism 
and accept accounts of the psychology neces-
sary for moral judgment are committed to 
empirical claims about human psychology. 
Consider cognitivist internalists who take 
moral judgments to be beliefs that can pro-
duce their own motivational force. Their ac-
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count dictates that if human beings can make 
moral judgments, humans have beliefs that 
can produce their own motivational force. If 
the Humean Theory is true only about hu-
mans, cognitivist internalism leads us to the 
disastrous result that humans can’t make 
moral judgments. In that case, the conceptual 
possibility that nonhuman creatures can 
make moral judgments will be of little com-
fort to most cognitivist internalists. 
Most of Humean Nature is an extended 
empirical argument for the Humean Theory. 
I argue that the Humean Theory provides 
the best explanation not only of motivation, 
but also of our thoughts and feelings in prac-
tical deliberation. The predictions of the 
Humean theory go beyond motivation, be-
cause desire does much more than motivate 
action. It causes pleasure when we think of 
getting what we want and displeasure when 
we think of failing to get it. It directs atten-
tion towards things we associate with the ob-
ject of desire. All these effects become 
stronger when the object is more vivid. These 
aspects of desire explain the reflective and 
emotional phenomenology of deliberation. 
For a quick illustration of desire’s phe-
nomenological effects, consider the desire to 
eat that is part of hunger. Motivation to eat is 
only one of its many effects. Hungry people 
are also pleased to hear that they’ll be served 
delicious meals and displeased to hear that 
they won’t. They pay more attention to food 
items in their environment than other people 
do, and spend more time and energy thinking 
about how to get food. Sights and smells of 
delicious food strengthen all these effects of 
desire. Timothy Schroeder6 has described the 
neurological structures that underlie the mo-
tivational and hedonic effects of desire at 
length, and there is further evidence for con-
nections between desire and the portions of 
the brain that direct attention and modulate 
the vividness of sensory and imaginative rep-
resentations. 
Aversive motivations like fear have simi-
lar effects. People who fear spiders feel the 
unpleasant feeling of fear when they think 
about spiders or are alerted to their presence, 
and may feel relief when the spiders are gone. 
When presented with situations that include 
spiders and innocuous household objects, 
they’ll pay more attention to the spiders. Viv-
id sensory or imaginative representations of 
spiders will increase the strength of all these 
aversive responses. Since aversions exhibit 
the properties of desires, they count as a sub-
class of desires. 
If the Humean Theory is true, every moti-
vational state in human psychology has similar 
hedonic, attentional, and vividness-related ef-
fects. This may be most obvious with motiva-
tional states broadly understood as desires or 
aversions, like desiring food and fearing spi-
ders. But it’s less obvious in other cases, in-
cluding willpower and moral motivation. The 
main task of Humean Nature is to consider 
the phenomena that opponents of the 
Humean Theory regard as most difficult for it 
to address, and show it provides better expla-
nations of those phenomena than opposing 
views. 
Consider cases where action is accompa-
nied by the feeling of obligation. Kant and 
many others regard motivation in these cases 
as coming from a different psychological 
state than desire – perhaps a motivationally 
potent belief about one’s duty. The feeling of 
obligation is phenomenologically different 
from the feeling of desire as we experience it 
in many ordinary cases, lending support to 
this objection. Some anti-Humeans have pre-
sented this as a counterexample to the 
Humean Theory, treating the distinctive phe-
nomenology as suggesting that motivation 
comes from a mental state other than desire. 
Humeans can account for the feeling of 
obligation in terms of the phenomenology of 
aversion. If you’re the kind of person who 
takes your promises seriously, you’ll feel anx-
ious when it looks like you’ll have to break a 
promise. Your attention will be drawn to 
things you associate with the promise, like the 
person to whom you made the promise and 
courses of action that might allow you to keep 
the promise. If you cleverly discover a course 
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of action that lets you keep the promise, you 
may feel some relief. But if you don’t, you’re 
likely to feel considerable displeasure about 
having to break the promise – especially if you 
have a vivid representation that you associate 
with it, like looking into the eyes of the person 
to whom you made it. In its attentional, he-
donic, and vividness-related effects, motiva-
tion accompanied by the feeling of obligation 
displays the properties of desire. 
The Humean Theory explains the phe-
nomenology of obligation better than anti-
Humean views can. If the accompanying mo-
tivation really comes from a belief about du-
ty, why do its attentional, hedonic, and viv-
idness-related effects more closely resemble 
the effects of aversion (which is a type of de-
sire) than those of belief? There are more 
things anti-Humeans can say here, but I 
don’t see any way for them to eliminate the 
Humean advantage. By adding attentional, 
hedonic, and vividness-related effects to the 
properties of belief, they can account for the 
data. But then they duplicate all the proper-
ties of desire as properties of belief, so that 
the Humean Theory is simpler. When anti-
Humean views are developed so that they 
can address all the phenomenological data, 
the Humean Theory invariably allows us to 
develop a simpler total psychological theory. 
Most of Humean Nature is devoted to 
showing that the Humean Theory provides 
the best explanations of phenomena that 
have been presented as evidence for anti-
Humean views. After addressing the feeling 
of obligation, as summarized above, I consid-
er other phenomena largely explained by the 
Hedonic Aspect of desire: 
 
Desire that E combined with increasing 
subjective probability of E or vivid senso-
ry or imaginative representation of E 
causes pleasure roughly proportional to 
the desire’s strength times the increase in 
probability or the vividness of the repre-
sentation. (With decreasing subjective 
probability of E or vivid sensory or imag-
inative representation of not-E, it like-
wise causes displeasure.)7 
 
Stephen Darwall8 proposes a counterex-
ample to the Desire-Belief Theory of Reason-
ing. He describes a case in which his protag-
onist, Roberta, learns of others’ suffering. She 
responds with shock and dismay, and forms a 
desire to help them from her beliefs alone. I 
respond that the unpleasant phenomenology 
of discovering others’ suffering – a realistic 
feature of his case – is evidence of Roberta’s 
pre-existing aversion to suffering. The He-
donic Aspect of desire explains such unpleas-
ant feelings when one receives vivid evidence 
of something one is averse to. Reasoning pro-
ceeds from this aversion, as the Humean The-
ory requires. Belief alone lacks this robust he-
donic phenomenology, so anti-Humean views 
don’t explain the shock and dismay that we 
feel under these conditions. 
Danielle Bromwich9 argues that motiva-
tion to answer questions can come simply 
from the belief one expresses in answering, 
and not from desire. I reply by noting the he-
donic phenomenology associated with re-
ceiving questions, which can include dis-
pleasure about being unhelpful to the ques-
tioner or saying something false. Since the 
mental state motivating us is hedonically 
charged, it must be a desire and not a belief. 
Sabine Döring10 challenges Humeans to 
explain expressive actions like kicking a table 
out of anger, which are accompanied by 
strong feelings and don’t involve thought of 
further ends. I suggest understanding anger 
as including a desire to act violently, for 
which kicking a table is a constitutive means 
rather than a causal means. The Hedonic As-
pect explains our feelings in these cases, while 
also addressing others where motivation and 
feeling occur at different times. My aversion 
to being naked in public causes feeling with-
out motivation when I vividly imagine being 
naked in public, and causes motivation with-
out feeling when I dress myself in the morn-
ing. Since means-end beliefs activate motiva-
tion while feeling is activated by new evi-
dence and vivid representations, motivation 
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and feeling will occur separately when only 
one activation condition is present, and oc-
cur together when both activation conditions 
are present. 
The Hedonic Aspect gives the Humean 
Theory a broad explanatory advantage. It 
explains the correlation between being moti-
vated to make something happen, being 
pleased by representations of it, and being 
displeased by representations of its not hap-
pening. Theories on which a belief about rea-
sons is sufficient for motivation fail to ex-
plain this correlation, as belief doesn’t have 
the right functional properties to explain 
pleasure and displeasure. 
The emotional perception model incorpo-
rates the Hedonic Aspect into a Humean ac-
count of moral judgment (see Fig. 1). 
Moral judgment formation typically be-
gins when representations of objects activate 
our emotional dispositions, producing feel-
ings like guilt, horror, and admiration to-
wards the objects. These moral feelings per-
ceptually represent the objects as morally 
significant. Horror makes situations look 
horrible; guilt makes actions look wrong; 
admiration makes people look virtuous. 
These feelings cause beliefs about the facts 
they represent, as perceptual experience of-
ten does. Just as a yellow experience in look-
ing at a lemon can cause the belief that it’s 
yellow, a feeling of guilt in considering an ac-
tion can cause the belief that it’s wrong. My 
model is much like that of Jesse Prinz,11 ex-
cept that I treat the moral judgment merely 
as the belief generated at the end of the pro-
cess, which concerns an objective moral fact. 
This maintains cognitivism and objectivity. 
Since moral judgments are beliefs, they 
can be created through testimony or argu-
ment as well. Like beliefs about color, moral 
beliefs can be learned from what others tell 
us or inferred from premises. But these pro-
cesses usually require a previous step of mor-
al feeling causing belief, where one accepts a 
premise of the inference, or where others 
form the belief that they communicate. 
If we believe we can prevent the situations 
that horrify us, or act in ways we’d be proud of 
rather than guilty about, we’re usually motivat-
ed to do so. As the diagram indicates, this mo-
tivation usually comes directly from the emo-
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tional disposition, which is also the source of 
the moral feeling. (Since the emotional disposi-
tions involved in moral judgment motivate ac-
tion, produce pleasant and unpleasant feelings, 
and display the other aspects of desire, I de-
scribe them as containing desires. The proper-
ties of desire are a subset of the properties of 
emotional dispositions.) In some cases, moral 
motivation involves the moral belief generated 
at the end combining with a desire that has 
moral content. Desiring not to do what’s wrong 
and believing that lying is wrong can motivate 
me not to lie. Either way, moral beliefs don’t 
motivate action by themselves. 
Implicit in the emotional perception model 
is a cognitivist, externalist, and Humean solu-
tion to our metaethical puzzle. The model is 
cognitivist, treating moral judgment as belief. 
It’s externalist, as it doesn’t give moral beliefs 
intrinsic motivational force. It’s Humean, treat-
ing desire-belief pairs as the psychological caus-
es of all motivation and practical reasoning. 
I argue that the model provides the best 
explanation of a wide range of experimental 
phenomena. Its perceptual account of how 
moral feelings generate moral beliefs helps to 
address manipulations of moral judgment by 
Schnall12 and Laham and colleagues,13 as well 
as Haidt’s14 dumbfounding results. Since 
moral beliefs are typically caused by hedon-
ically charged feelings rather than reasoning, 
artificially inducing unpleasant feelings can 
make us see things as morally worse. Like 
color beliefs, moral beliefs can be manipulat-
ed by changes in the perceiver’s color experi-
ence. Further support comes from research 
on psychopaths, who exhibit motivational 
and conceptual deficiencies that the model 
would lead us to expect from people unable 
to have moral emotions. 
The emotional perception model treats 
moral beliefs as formed through moral feel-
ings, much as color beliefs are formed through 
color experience. Many philosophers see color 
experience as giving us our grasp of color con-
cepts. If the analogy holds, moral feelings 
might give us our grasp of moral concepts. 
This experientialist analysis of moral concepts 
develops this idea (See Tab. 1).  
Experientialism treats moral judgments as 
concerning the objective accuracy-conditions 
of feelings. Moral concepts resemble color 
concepts in that we can’t fully master them 
without having particular sorts of experience. 
Without knowing what yellow-experience is 
like, we can’t master the concept of yellow. 
Without knowing what guilt feels like, we 
can’t master the concept of wrongness. Fun-
damental moral questions aren’t fundamental-
ly about what to do, but what to hope for, 
whom to admire, and what to feel proud or 
guilty about doing – the last of which can be 
reinterpreted as the moral “What to do?” 
question. 
The Attentional Aspect of desire explains 
phenomena that appear in activities as di-
verse as reasoning and daydreaming: 
 
Desire that E disposes one to attend to 
things one associates with E, increasing 
with the desire’s strength and the 
strength of the association.15  
Tab. 1 
GOOD states of affairs objectively represented by accurate hope and delight 
RIGHT actions objectively represented by accurate pride and approval 
VIRTUE character traits objectively represented by accurate admiration 
BAD states of affairs objectively represented by accurate horror and sorrow 
WRONG actions objectively represented by accurate guilt and indignation 
VICE character traits objectively represented by accurate contempt and hatred 
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For a simple illustration, consider how the 
hungry pay more attention to food than 
those who have eaten their fill, and how sex-
ual desire directs attention towards the peo-
ple one finds attractive. Things we associate 
with the objects of our desires are more sali-
ent to us than things we don’t associate with 
the objects of our desires.  
The Attentional Aspect lets desire itself 
explain practical reasoning. Desire directs at-
tention onto the premises of our practical in-
ferences. If I desire E, attending to the fact 
that A-ing will raise the probability of E can 
motivate me to A. Attention is important for 
generating motivation. Even if I know that a 
particular bus will take me to the train sta-
tion I want to reach, I won’t be motivated to 
board it if I don’t attend to this fact in time. 
Philosophers in the Anscombean tradition 
have taken interest in our automatic 
knowledge of what we’re doing intentionally. 
Part of the explanation is that desire directs our 
attention towards our actions, since we believe 
that they’ll help us attain desired things. At-
tending to something helps us learn the obvious 
facts about it, and attending to our actions lets 
us know that we’re doing them. This is an al-
ternative to an anti-Humean explanation pre-
ferred by some Anscombeans, on which this 
knowledge results from intentions being moti-
vationally potent beliefs. 
Nishi Shah and David Velleman16 ask why 
we move so quickly from the question 
“Whether to believe that p?” to “Whether p?” 
While they argue that this psychological 
transition reveals our concept of belief to in-
clude a norm of truth, Humeans can simply 
understand it in terms of desire redirecting 
our attention. Since our interest in whether 
to believe something usually comes from 
whether it’s true, our attention typically 
shifts toward the more salient question. But 
when truth isn’t the most important issue, 
our attention often shifts in other ways. 
The Attentional Aspect explains much 
about the course of our daydreams. Hunger 
makes us daydream about food; sexual desire 
makes us daydream about people we’re at-
tracted to. The Hedonic Aspect explains why 
these thoughts are often pleasant. 
The attractions of the Humean theory in-
clude a desire-belief account of intention that 
responds to objections from Michael Brat-
man.17 According to the account, A intends 
that φ if A has a desire and belief such that 
for some behavior B and situation S: 
 
(1)  A desires that φ. 
(2)  The desire is combined with a belief that 
S will obtain, and that A’s B-ing in S 
would make φ more likely.  
(3)  If the desire were combined with a belief 
that S obtains now, they would without 
further reasoning produce motivational 
force sufficient for A to immediately ini-
tiate B-ing.  
 
Bratman argues that such accounts can’t 
explain the role of intentions in planning. 
Why, for example, does my intention to go to 
the library dispose me to deliberate about how 
to get to the library? The Attentional Aspect 
explains this. An intention to go to the library 
includes a desire to go to the library, which di-
rects attention towards going-to-the-library-
related matters. Deliberating about how to get 
to the library includes attending in this way. 
Such attention will combine premises of prac-
tical inference to generate further intentions 
about how to get there. 
How do agents with lots of desires and 
beliefs manage to form intentions without 
being overloaded by computational complex-
ity? Part of the answer is that we only engage 
with the desire- and belief-contents that we 
can attend to at once. This avoids cognitive 
overload, but leaves us at risk of making bad 
decisions if we don’t attend to all the relevant 
considerations. Humans frequently make 
poor decisions by failing to attend to all the 
relevant considerations in this way, as the 
Humean Theory predicts. 
Revising our intentions has a hedonic 
phenomenology. If you’ve long intended to 
take a vacation to the beach, you may be dis-
appointed if travel problems keep you from 
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going there. The Hedonic Aspect explains 
this. Your subjective probability of desire-
satisfaction has declined, creating displeasure. 
Bratman’s recent work defends a reduc-
tion of joint intention to individual intention. 
I argue that a desire-belief account can help 
with this project. When agents have joint in-
tentions of the sort Bratman describes, they 
exhibit all the aspects of desire. So if Bratman 
accepts a desire-belief account, his reduction-
ism about joint intention can explain these 
phenomena. 
Another aspect of desire, Amplification 
by Vividness, is particularly useful in explain-
ing irrational behavior: 
 
The effects of desire that E increase pro-
portionally with the vividness of sensory 
or imaginative representations of E.18  
 
As Hume notes, vivid representations of 
their objects can turn our calm passions vio-
lent. A hungry person presented with vivid 
representations of delicious food will be 
more motivated to eat it, more pleased to re-
ceive it, and more disposed to attend to it. 
Procrastination provides a simple illustra-
tion of Amplification by Vividness. I’ve wasted 
a lot of time on the internet when I should’ve 
been writing this article. When I opened Face-
book, all the interesting things my friends were 
posting were more vivid to me than the long-
term benefits of making progress on my work. 
If the benefits of working had been represented 
with equal or greater vividness, I probably 
would’ve gotten more work done. 
Akrasia provides another illustration. 
Sometimes when I tell myself that I really 
should get back to work and stop wasting 
time on the internet, I keep wasting time an-
yway. My occurrent belief that it would be 
better to work can’t motivate me by itself, 
and my desires to work are overpowered by 
desires amplified by vivid representations on 
the internet. As this case demonstrates, the 
Humean Theory can predict and explain ir-
rational behavior just as it predicts and ex-
plains rational behavior. 
Some phenomena that Tamar Gendler19 
explains in terms of alief are better explained 
by Amplification by Vividness. These include 
the fear and hesitation of those who walked 
onto the clear glass of the Grand Canyon 
Skywalk, with a 2000-foot drop vividly repre-
sented beneath their feet. Gendler’s formula-
tion of alief doesn’t provide any precise pre-
dictions of how they feel and act. Amplifica-
tion by Vividness predicts that those with an 
ordinary aversion to heights will hesitate to 
step onto the walkway despite knowing 
they’re safe, with fearful attention to the 
drop below. 
We can exercise willpower by redirecting 
attention away from temptation or towards a 
goal. Doing so makes temptation less vivid or 
the goal more vivid, reducing motivation to 
pursue temptation or increasing motivation 
to pursue the goal. This redirection of atten-
tion is an intentional action that fits into the 
dual-process model popular among psy-
chologists as a System 2 process. 
Richard Holton20 challenges Humeans to 
explain why willpower is «something that it 
takes effort to employ, that tires in the short 
run, but that can be built up in the long run».21 
It takes effort to redirect attention against our 
natural tendencies, like the tendency to attend 
to nearby temptations. Behavior that takes ef-
fort tires us in the short run, but can become 
more automatic in the long run. 
The Humean account of how we perceive 
and act on reasons largely follows the emo-
tional perception model of Chapter 4. Desire 
makes its objects hedonically and attentionally 
salient. Courses of action that are salient in 
this way seem to invite further consideration, 
giving us a sense that we might pursue them. 
Experiences of salience cause beliefs about 
reasons for action, in the same perceptual way 
that color experience causes color belief. 
Motivation to act for reasons typically 
comes from desires that caused experiences 
of salience that caused beliefs about reasons. 
We can be motivated in other ways. If one 
has a desire to act for reasons, the belief 
about reasons can act as a means-end belief. 
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If one accepts a Humean theory of reasons 
and knows what one desires, one can be mo-
tivated by recognizing that action will raise 
the probability of attaining one of the many 
things one desires. But beliefs about reasons 
lack intrinsic motivational force. 
Responding to T.M. Scanlon,22 I explain 
how reasons can be excluded from considera-
tion in deliberation. If I know that I won’t 
pursue a particular object of desire because 
my other desires push so strongly against do-
ing so, the object seems inaccessible and is 
excluded from consideration. It’s as if a phys-
ical barrier prevents me from pursuing it, 
though in fact the barrier is constituted by 
my own motivational structure. 
Kieran Setiya23 challenges Humeans to 
explain how we can choose to do a particular 
action for one reason rather than another. 
This happens when strong desires not to do 
something for a particular bad reason moti-
vate me not to do it for that reason. I may 
then do it for a different reason without in-
terference from these desires. This requires 
an impressive sort of self-knowledge about 
my motivations, without which I might act 
for the bad reason while thinking I’m acting 
for a better reason. 
David Enoch24 presents several arguments 
that non-natural reasons are indispensable to 
deliberation. These arguments tacitly assume 
an anti-Humean deliberative psychology. 
Substituting a Humean psychology would 
turn them into arguments for Mark Schroed-
er’s view. One argument is that reasons seem 
just too different from natural facts for natu-
ralistic reductions of reasons to be true. But 
in their hedonic and attentional salience, rea-
sons seem just like natural facts seen in the 
light of desire. 
Moral requirements are often understood 
as providing categorical reasons for action, 
which Humean accounts of reasons don’t 
support. I agree with Philippa Foot25 that this 
is the wrong way to understand moral re-
quirements. I instead propose the experien-
tialist analysis: moral requirements concern 
objective accuracy-conditions for feeling, 
which require no further explanation in 
terms of reasons for action. 
The psychological explanations provided so 
far combine to support a Humean account of 
agency. This account treats all of the agent's de-
sires as partially constituting the agent. (I take 
“self” and “agent” to refer to the same thing in 
the context at hand.) One’s self includes what-
ever explains one’s actions and one’s thoughts 
and feelings in practical deliberation. Desire is 
the sole motivational state explaining these 
phenomena, doing away with the need for mo-
tivationally potent beliefs and irreducible inten-
tions. So the self includes no motivational states 
apart from desire. 
Kantians often object that the Humean 
Theory leaves no place for agents in the cau-
sation of action, since it appeals to beliefs 
and desires rather than agents. The Humean 
account of the self provides a straightforward 
response. The desires constitute the agent, 
and cause action. Agents can cause action be-
cause of the causal powers of the desires con-
stituting them. 
Christine Korsgaard26 has argued that re-
flective endorsement is essential to agency. 
This view fails to account for a variety of in-
tentional actions that don’t involve reflective 
endorsement, including spontaneous behav-
ior and the cases of rational akrasia described 
by Nomy Arpaly.27 Reflective endorsement is 
also insufficient for unifying the self, in any 
ordinary sense of what one’s self is. Desires 
that don’t align with one’s decision remain in 
the self, causing dissatisfaction with one’s re-
flective decision. 
How the Humean Theory addresses cases 
where one is internally divided or alienated 
from the mental states driving one’s behavior 
will depend on whether these mental states 
display all the properties of desire, including 
the Hedonic Aspect. If so, one performs a 
genuine intentional action, even if one is al-
ienated from one’s behavior. But if not, as in 
some cases of purely compulsive behavior, it 
isn’t intentional action. Without the emo-
tional investment that the Hedonic Aspect 
provides, the action isn’t one’s own at all. 
  Sinhababu 
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I conclude by surveying the metaethical 
consequences of the Humean Theory. Views 
that combine cognitivism and internalism, 
treating moral judgments as beliefs with in-
trinsic motivational force, don’t allow human 
agents and other Humean agents to make 
moral judgments. A similar bad result holds 
for some sophisticated noncognitivist views, 
which invent new mental states that combine 
inferential relations typical of belief with the 
motivational force typical of desire. All these 
views lead to human incapabilism about 
moral judgment, since they understand moral 
judgments as mental state types that humans 
don’t have. 
Fortunately, a better theory of moral 
judgment is available. A cognitivist view that 
abandons internalism for experientialism fits 
well with our Humean nature. 
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